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Abstract
Background: The effectiveness of single-drug antiviral interventions to reduce morbidity and mortality during the next
influenza pandemic will be substantially weakened if transmissible strains emerge which are resistant to the stockpiled
antiviral drugs. We developed a mathematical model to test the hypothesis that a small stockpile of a secondary antiviral
drug could be used to mitigate the adverse consequences of the emergence of resistant strains.
Methods and Findings: We used a multistrain stochastic transmission model of influenza to show that the spread of
antiviral resistance can be significantly reduced by deploying a small stockpile (1% population coverage) of a secondary
drug during the early phase of local epidemics. We considered two strategies for the use of the secondary stockpile: early
combination chemotherapy (ECC; individuals are treated with both drugs in combination while both are available); and
sequential multidrug chemotherapy (SMC; individuals are treated only with the secondary drug until it is exhausted, then
treated with the primary drug). We investigated all potentially important regions of unknown parameter space and found
that both ECC and SMC reduced the cumulative attack rate (AR) and the resistant attack rate (RAR) unless the probability of
emergence of resistance to the primary drug pA was so low (less than 1 in 10,000) that resistance was unlikely to be a
problem or so high (more than 1 in 20) that resistance emerged as soon as primary drug monotherapy began. For example,
when the basic reproductive number was 1.8 and 40% of symptomatic individuals were treated with antivirals, AR and RAR
were 67% and 38% under monotherapy if pA=0.01. If the probability of resistance emergence for the secondary drug was
also 0.01, then SMC reduced AR and RAR to 57% and 2%. The effectiveness of ECC was similar if combination chemotherapy
reduced the probabilities of resistance emergence by at least ten times. We extended our model using travel data between
105 large cities to investigate the robustness of these resistance-limiting strategies at a global scale. We found that as long
as populations that were the main source of resistant strains employed these strategies (SMC or ECC), then those same
strategies were also effective for populations far from the source even when some intermediate populations failed to
control resistance. In essence, through the existence of many wild-type epidemics, the interconnectedness of the global
network dampened the international spread of resistant strains.
Conclusions: Our results indicate that the augmentation of existing stockpiles of a single anti-influenza drug with smaller
stockpiles of a second drug could be an effective and inexpensive epidemiological hedge against antiviral resistance if
either SMC or ECC were used. Choosing between these strategies will require additional empirical studies. Specifically, the
choice will depend on the safety of combination therapy and the synergistic effect of one antiviral in suppressing the
emergence of resistance to the other antiviral when both are taken in combination.
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Large-scale antiviral treatment and targeted prophylaxis may
provide substantial public health benefits by slowing the spread of
pandemic influenza [1–7]. Although it is not certain that existing
antivirals will be effective against the eventual pandemic strain,
many countries are investing in large stockpiles of a single drug
(oseltamivir [Tamiflu])[8]. Such massiveuseof a singleantiviralwill
substantially increase the risk of emergence of resistant strains. For
H3N2 strains, de novo emergence of resistance occurs in 0.4% of
outpatient adults and 5.5% of outpatient children treated with
oseltamivir [9]. If the rate of de novo emergence is similar for the
pandemic strain, resistance will certainly emerge under large-scale
antiviral intervention [5]. Although most oseltamivir-resistant
H3N2 strains are less fit (i.e. less transmissible) than the wild type
[10] and therefore cannot spread widely [11], there is no guarantee
that this will be the case for the yet-to-be-observed pandemic strain.
Indeed, the recent establishment of oseltamivir-resistant H1N1
viruses suggests that oseltamivir-resistant strains do not necessarily
incur fitness costs [12–18]. The spread of antiviral resistance during
a pandemic will substantially reduce the effectiveness of antiviral
intervention [5,19–21]. Despite this potential threat, countries
stockpiling antivirals have not yet declared any strategies to hedge
against the risk of antiviral resistance. Here, we test the hypothesis
that a small stockpile of a secondary antiviral drug could be used to
effectively mitigate the adverse consequences of the emergence of
resistant influenza strains.
Methods
Natural History and Transmissibility
We adopted the natural history model (Figure A in Text S1)
used in our previous study of influenza pandemic mitigation [7].
Infected individuals progressed from S (susceptible) through E
(latent) to P (infectious and presymptomatic) to I (infectious and
symptomatic, with probability ps=0.67) or A (infectious and
asymptomatic, with probability 12ps=0.33) and finally to R
(removed). Each symptomatic individual was treated with
antivirals with probability pT at the onset of symptoms. In the
base case, we assumed that the basic reproductive number was
R0=1.8 [2,3,22], the generation time was TG=2.6 d [3], the
proportion of infections in which the infector was not symptomatic
was h=0.3 [7], and the treatment probability was pT=0.4. Under
antiviral intervention, the effective reproductive number of the
wild type was
Reff~R0: X=Y ðÞ with
X~hPresymptomaticED Presymptomatic

z 1{pS ðÞ hAsymptomaticED Asymptomatic

zpS 1{pTe ðÞ hSymptomaticED Symptomatic

Y~hPresymptomaticED Presymptomatic

z 1{pS ðÞ hAsymptomaticED Asymptomatic

zpShSymptomaticED Symptomatic

,
where hi was the relative infectiousness of disease stage i, E[Di]w a s
its mean duration, and e=66% was the efficacy of antivirals in
reducing infectiousness [23,24]. In the absence of resistance,
antiviral treatment eliminated pTe(12h)=18.5% of transmission
per infected individual on average. This level of large-scale antiviral
intervention was not sufficient to eradicate the epidemic in its early
stages, but could nonetheless be useful in reducing the total number
of persons infected as the epidemic sweeps through the population,
while still allowing enough people to become infected so that herd
immunity would prevent a second epidemic [25].
Multiple Drugs and Strains
Our objective was to investigate the possible benefits of
multidrug strategies over monotherapy in terms of reducing the
impact of treatment-induced resistance. Therefore, we considered
antiviral therapies in a generic sense: drug A was the primary
antiviral in national stockpiles and drug B was the secondary
antiviral to be used to reduce the emergence and spread of
resistance. In the context of currently available influenza antivirals
and pandemic preparedness, drug A would be oseltamivir because
that is the drug that has been stockpiled. Drug B could be
zanamivir (Relenza) or an adamantane derivative (amantadine
[Symmetrel] or rimantadine [Flumadine]). Although there are few
data from humans (or from good animals models of human
influenza) that combination antiviral therapy can reduce the
emergence of resistance [26], a recent study showed that
combination chemotherapy with oseltamivir and amantadine
substantially reduced the emergence of drug-resistant influenza
variants in vitro [27]. Further, at the population level, the
transmission of strains that are resistant to only one of the drugs
will likely be hindered by combination chemotherapy [28,29]. As a
key premise of this study, we assumed that the wild-type pandemic
strain was sensitive to both drugs with probabilities of emergence
of resistance pA and pB. If a wild-type case was treated with
combination chemotherapy, the probabilities of emergence of
resistance were reduced by a synergy proportion s (Figure B in
Text S1). The degree of synergy would likely depend on the
specific classes of drugs that are used in combination, e.g.,
oseltamivir and zanamivir versus oseltamivir and an adamantane
derivative (see Discussion). If the strain under treatment was
already resistant to one drug, we assumed that combination
chemotherapy had no effect in reducing emergence rates.
Combination chemotherapy reduced infectiousness by e=66%
(i.e., same as monotherapy) unless the treated case was resistant to
both drugs. Also, resistant strains had the same natural history as
the wild type and no fitness cost (all strains were equally
transmissible). In our sensitivity analysis, we considered the impact
of fitness cost on the spread of antiviral resistance and the
effectiveness of our hedging strategies (see Discussion). Recovery
from infection with any strain provided immunity to all strains.
Global Transmission Network
We used a discrete-time stochastic multistrain transmission
model to simulate the spread of pandemic influenza in a global
network of 105 major cities (see Text S1). We assumed
homogeneous mixing within each city. The simulation proceeded
with a time-step of 0.25 d, which was small enough to be accurate
(an independent discrete-event simulation was used to calibrate the
time-step; see Text S1). The network was parameterized with the
travel and city data previously used to study the international
spread of pandemic influenza [30]. We assumed that the average
duration of travel was 7 d and that individuals on travel did not
receive antiviral treatment. See Text S1 for algorithmic details of
the simulations.
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Our main outcome variables were attack rate (AR, the final
proportion of the population infected, both with and without
symptoms) and resistant attack rate (RAR, the final proportion
infected with a strain resistant to the primary antiviral). AR and
RAR are both important measures for the impact of the spread of
antiviral resistance. For example, AR reflects the overall societal
impact (e.g., burden on the health care system, work absenteeism)
posed by the pandemic; RAR indicates the number of infections
not treatable by the primary antiviral and therefore may reflect the
impact of antiviral resistance on pandemic mortality.
Results
Monotherapy in a Closed Population
We investigated the dynamics of resistance emergence and
mitigation in the first large population to implement large-scale
antiviral treatment (assumed to have 6.8 million individuals, the
size of Hong Kong). Our baseline scenario was that resistance to
the primary antiviral (drug A) emerged with probability pA=0.01
per treated symptomatic individual. Typically, for R0=1.8, the
demand created by a treatment probability of pT=0.4 was satisfied
by a stockpile sufficient to treat 20% of the population (i.e.,
stockpile coverage of 20%).
Under monotherapy, there was substantial stochastic variation
in AR and RAR among different stochastic realizations, even in a
large population, across a wide range of probabilities of emergence
of resistance pA (Figure 1A). This variation existed because AR and
RAR were sensitive to the time at which resistance first emerged
and started to spread: if resistance emerged early in the epidemic,
the resistant strain dominated transmission (Figure 1B, upper
graph). Conversely, the spread of resistance was limited if
resistance did not emerge early (Figure 1B, lower graph). Because
the number of treated cases was small during the early stages when
the epidemic size was still small, the time at which resistance first
emerged had substantial stochastic variation, hence the stochastic
variation in AR and RAR seen in Figure 1A.
In view of the dramatic impact of early emergence of resistance
on AR and RAR, we considered next the effect of a deterministic
delay in the emergence of resistance (Figure 1C). We defined t100
to be the time at which the number of resistant cases first reached
100 and y100 to be the cumulative number of wild-type infections
at t100.A sy100 increased, the final attack rates AR and RAR
decreased because (i) there were more wild-type infectors
competing with resistant infectors for susceptible individuals, and
(ii) the number of susceptible individuals available for the resistant
strain decreased. While the reduction in AR might appear to be
limited (a maximal drop of 17% from 73% when all cases were
resistant to 56% when resistance was absent; Figure 1C, lower
graph), the corresponding reduction in RAR could be very large
(Figure 1C, upper graph). A large drop in RAR necessarily implies
that more infected cases will be sensitive to antiviral treatment, a
factor which is likely to be critical for minimizing case fatalities.
The results in Figure 1C suggested that unless the probability of
resistance emergence was very high, the spread of resistance could
be substantially reduced if emergence could be delayed until the
cumulative number of wild-type infections had reached 10
5 (1.5%
of the population). This threshold was robust against variations in
population size (Figure J in Text S1). In principle, such a delay
could be achieved simply by postponing the launch of antiviral
intervention (with only a minimal cost in terms of additional
infections). However, because of the high therapeutic value of
antivirals, even a short deliberate delay is undesirable and likely
unethical. Therefore, as an alternative, we propose the deploy-
ment of a small stockpile of a secondary antiviral during the early
phase of the local epidemic.
Small Stockpiles of a Secondary Antiviral
We considered two alternative strategies for the deployment of
the secondary antiviral. Under early combination chemotherapy
(ECC), at the start of the epidemic, symptomatic individuals were
treated (with probability pT) with both primary antiviral (drug A,
large stockpile) and secondary antiviral (drug B, small stockpile) in
combination until the stockpile of drug B was depleted. After that
time, treatment comprised only drug A. Individuals infected with
the wild-type strain and treated with both drugs could generate
strains resistant to either drug (Figure B in Text S1). However,
probabilities of resistance emergence were reduced by a synergy
factor s [27,31,32]. Under sequential multidrug chemotherapy
(SMC), individuals received only drug B until the secondary
stockpile was exhausted, after which time treatment comprised
only drug A. We considered a stockpile of drug B sufficient to treat
1% of the population (i.e. stockpile coverage of 1%). This was
small compared with the coverage of drug A required for large-
scale antiviral intervention (,20%), but was sufficient to
implement SMC or ECC.
Both SMC and ECC were effective in reducing the spread of
resistance across a wide range of pA when the probability of
resistance emergence to the secondary antiviral was pB=0.01
(Figure 1D; Table 1). Given the absence of zanamivir resistance in
naturally occurring influenza strains, pB=0.01 may be viewed as a
reasonable upper bound for zanamivir, and our baseline scenario
may be interpreted as zanamivir being the secondary antiviral.
When synergy was perfect (s=1), ECC was the most effective,
reducing the mean AR from 67% to 57% (RAR from 38% to 3%)
(see Table 1). Even when synergy was absent (s=0), ECC reduced
the mean AR from 67% to 59% (RAR from 38% to 9%):
combination chemotherapy reduced the infectiousness of cases
that were resistant to drug A but sensitive to drug B, thereby
decreasing the competitiveness of these A-resistant cases against
the wild types unless these cases became dually resistant. However,
when synergy was low, the effectiveness of ECC deteriorated as pB
increased (Table 1; Table B and Figure C in Text S1). For
example, when s=0, pA=0.01, and pB=0.05, ECC reduced the
mean AR from 67% to only 61% (RAR from 38% to 14%). In
contrast, SMC remained effective even when pB was high because
it delayed the emergence of A-resistant cases by simply substituting
A-monotherapy with B-monotherapy during the early stage
(Table 1; Table B and Figure C in Text S1). In summary, ECC
was superior to SMC when synergy was high (enhancing the
specific benefit of combination therapy in reducing emergence) or
when pA was low (in which case the performance gap was small).
Otherwise, SMC was more successful, because it reliably delayed
the emergence of drug-A resistance by not using drug A at the start
of antiviral intervention.
We conducted an extensive sensitivity analysis to investigate
explicitly how the benefits of ECC and SMC in hedging against
resistance varied across the space of unknown parameter values
(Figure 2). The potential value of a hedge against emergence of
resistance was assessed by comparing the attack rate under
monotherapy with the attack rate under monotherapy if resistance
were absent. This value was greatest at intermediate values of R0,
where large-scale antiviral intervention was able to make a
significant reduction in attack rate (up to 40%) yet the spread of
resistance was likely under monotherapy. In all cases, a hedge was
more useful for higher values of pA (Figure 2A). For values of R0
and pA for which a hedge was useful, ECC was an effective hedge
unless values of either pA or pB were very high, or both were
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for which a hedge was useful, SMC performed better than ECC
unless containment (here defined as AR,3%) was likely under
ECC but not SMC, which was the case when pB was high but the
probability of resistance emergence in a wild-type case under
combination chemotherapy, (12s)(pA+pB), was low, e.g., with very
high synergy (Figure 2C).
The choice between ECC and SMC is particularly sensitive to
the synergy parameter s. In the sensitivity analysis presented
above, we assumed treatment coverage of pT=0.4 and considered
a uniform distribution for possible values of the synergy parameter
s between 0 and 1. This choice favored SMC over ECC in
approximately eight out of every ten scenarios we considered
(Figure 2). Some experts believe that synergy is likely to be in the
Figure 1. Dynamics of resistance emergence and mitigation in a single population. Outcome variables were calculated using 10,000
simulations of 365 d in a population of 6.8 million individuals. See main text for baseline natural history parameters. (A) The baseline monotherapy
scenario was associated with substantial stochasticity for a wide range of values of pA (dashed lines, 95% prediction intervals; colored diamonds
indicate scenarios for emergence rates used in [C]). (B) Two stochastic realizations of the single-population epidemic with pA=0.01 (brown shaded
area corresponds to resistance incidence; blue shaded area corresponds to wild-type incidence; upper graph, resistance emerged early; lower graph,
resistance did not emerge early). (C) AR and RAR as functions of the cumulative number of wild-type infections at the time resistance emerged
(dashed lines, 95% prediction intervals; colors correspond to the value of pA as per diamonds in [A]; in the absence of interventions AR=73% and
RAR=0%; in the absence of resistance, AR=56% and RAR=0%). (D) Efficacy of ECC (antiviral synergies of s=0 and s=1) and SMC in reducing the
attack rate (shaded areas, 95% prediction intervals; purple shading indicates overlap between red and blue shades). Note that the results for ECC1
correspond to the thin gray area that forms the lower border of the green area.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000085.g001
Table 1. Example ARs and RARs under SMC and ECC with synergy of 0 (ECC0) or 1 (ECC1).
pA AR or RAR Mono SMC ECC1 ECC0 with pB=0.01 ECC0 with pB=0.05 ECC0 with pB=0.3
0.001 AR 58 (56, 68) 57 (56, 57) 56 (56, 56) 56 (56, 57) 56 (56, 60) 58 (56, 66)
RAR 7 (1, 42) 0 (0, 0) 0 (0, 0) 1 (0, 4) 2 (0, 11) 5 (1, 33)
0.01 AR 67 (62, 72) 58 (57, 58) 57 (57, 57) 59 (58, 64) 61 (58, 68) 65 (60, 71)
RAR 38 (18, 64) 2 (2, 3) 3 (3, 3) 9 (5, 24) 14 (6, 43) 29 (12, 59)
0.1 AR 72 (71, 73) 63 (63, 63) 63 (63, 63) 67 (66, 71) 69 (67, 72) 72 (70, 73)
RAR 66 (60, 71) 17 (15, 18) 18 (18, 18) 39 (32, 57) 49 (38, 65) 62 (54, 69)
Note: ARs and RARs are shown as means followed by the 95% prediction intervals. Three probabilities of resistance emergence for drug B are shown here: pB=0.01, 0.05,
and 0.3. Under SMC and ECC1 (ECC with perfect synergy), AR and RAR are insensitive to the value of pB in this range (see Table S2), hence only one set of outcomes is
shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000085.t001
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the probabilities of emergence of single-drug resistance by more
than 20 times). We repeated the sensitivity analysis (see Figures E
and F in Text S1) with higher values of synergy and with the
extreme assumption of perfect treatment coverage (pT=1). Under
these assumptions ECC was more effective than SMC in
approximately six out of every ten scenarios considered (see
Discussion).
Global Spread of Disease and Resistance
In the global context, the analysis described so far applies to a
‘‘source population,’’ one whose epidemic takes off early enough in
the pandemic so that the importation of resistant viruses is not a
significant risk. However, given the high connectivity among
populations in the global network, it was not apparent that ECC
or SMC would also be effective for other populations (downstream
populations), because they would more likely be seeded by
resistant strains than would source populations. Therefore, to
investigate the effectiveness of ECC and SMC at a global scale, we
simulated the international spread of a multistrain influenza
pandemic over a network of 105 major cities with Hong Kong as
the source [30]. We assumed the same baseline natural history and
emergence parameters as above and we selected 28 out of the 105
populations to have antiviral stockpiles (Figure 3). Conclusions
drawn from this scenario are robust against the number of
populations implementing antiviral intervention and the choice of
source population (see Text S1 and Figure G therein). Results are
presented only for the comparison between SMC and monother-
apy. However, results comparing ECC to monotherapy are not
qualitatively different.
If only monotherapy was used, the importation of resistance
promoted the spread of the resistant strain and downstream
populations had higher ARs and RARs, e.g., New York had a
higher AR and RAR than London because the pandemic reached
New York later, with a higher proportion of introduced infections
Figure 2. Sensitivity analysis. We used Latin-hypercube sampling to
generate 1,000 combinations of the following parameters: basic
reproductive number R0, linear scale on interval (1,3); generation time
TG, linear, (2,4) d; proportion of infections in which the infector was not
symptomatic h, linear, (0,0.3); proportion of h in which the infector was
never symptomatic, linear, (0,1); probability of emergence of resistance
to the primary antiviral pA, log, (10
25, 1); probability of emergence of
resistance to the secondary antiviral pB, log, (10
25, 1); synergistic effects
of combination therapy in reducing the rates of emergence of
resistance s, linear, (0,1) (see the left column of Figure E in Text S1 for
12s on log scale, (10
27, 1)). A probability of treatment of pT=0.4 was
used throughout (see the right column of Figure E in Text S1 for pT=1).
For each parameter combination, we estimated the mean attack rate
(from 2,500 realizations) for: monotherapy with resistance, AR(MONO);
monotherapy without resistance, AR(MONO/R), i.e., pA=pB=0; early
combination chemotherapy, AR(ECC); and sequential multidrug che-
motherapy, AR(SMC). (A) pA and R0 determined the usefulness of a
hedge against the emergence of resistance. Main chart, frequency of
parameter combinations versus the increase in monotherapy AR due to
resistance, AR(MONO)2AR(MONO/R); inset charts, parameter subsets
for AR(MONO)2AR(MONO/R),1% (left) and .1% (right, Set H), points
are colored as per the x-axis values in main chart. (B) If a hedge was
useful (i.e., for those parameter combinations in Set H), ECC failed if pA
or pB or both were large and synergy was not high. Main chart,
frequency of parameter combinations versus the marginal benefit of
ECC over monotherapy, AR(MONO)2AR(ECC); inset, distribution of
parameter combinations in the pB-pA plane for which AR(MONO)2AR(-
ECC),1%. Note: The colors here are not related to those in (A) (C) SMC
performed better than ECC except when combination therapy results in
very low probability of resistance emergence (e.g., very high synergy),
yet drug B monotherapy has a high risk of emergence, rendering drug B
monotherapy unsuitable and combination therapy highly effective. The
proportion of scenarios for which ECC outperformed SMC (i.e.
AR(ECC)2AR(SMC),0%) was 22%. In a subset of such scenarios, ECC,
but not SMC, had a high probability of achieving containment. Main
chart, frequency of parameter combinations versus AR(ECC)2AR(SMC).
Containment here was defined as an attack rate of ,3%. Inset charts,
distribution of parameter combinations for which AR(E-
CC)2AR(SMC),0%. Inset left, qc(SMC) and qc(ECC) were the proportion
of realizations with attack rate ,3% under SMC and ECC; inset right,
qc(SMC)%qc(ECC) when pB was high and (12s)(pA+pB) (the probability
of resistance emergence in a wild-type case under combination
chemotherapy) was low.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000085.g002
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small population of Geneva had a smaller RAR than London even
though the two were hit at approximately the same time: smaller
populations were less vulnerable to the local emergence of antiviral
resistance because fewer cases were treated with drug A. We note
that our city population sizes are only proxy measures for entire
local populations which feed into major airports (see Discussion).
If all 28 populations that had stockpiles of antivirals imple-
mented SMC rather than monotherapy, reductions in AR and
RAR in these populations were similar to those in a single source
population (Figure 3B). Therefore, the connectedness of cities had
little impact on the effectiveness of SMC if all populations that
implemented large-scale antiviral interventions adopted SMC.
The effectiveness of SMC was attenuated (but was still significant)
if only half of these 28 selected populations adopted SMC
(Figure 3C). Interestingly, in this scenario, those populations that
implemented only monotherapy (e.g., London) still benefited from
the implementation of SMC in the other populations because
fewer resistant cases were circulating within the network.
The source population was the key to the robustness of SMC as
a resistance-limiting strategy at the global scale. If the source
population implemented only monotherapy, then SMC had little
benefit in any downstream population (Figure 3D). If the source
population did implement SMC, then downstream populations
Figure 3. SMC in a global network of 105 cities. Hong Kong (HK) is the source of infection in the network with 30 wild-type seeds on day 0.
Twenty-eight cities implement large-scale antiviral intervention: Hong Kong, London, New York, Geneva, and 24 other cities (randomly chosen for
each stochastic realization). Cities that implemented SMC had a drug B stockpile coverage of 1%. In this 4-by-4 chart panel, each row corresponds to a
city (Hong Kong, London, New York or Geneva) and each column (A–D) corresponds to a different scenario. Each panel is the 2-D histogram (1,000
realizations) of attack rate (y-axes, 55%–75%) and resistant attack rate (x-axes, 0%–75%) for a given city and scenario. A bin size of 1% is used on both
axes. The color for each bin indicates the frequency for that bin within that chart (see legend), i.e., same color in different panels does not indicate
same frequency. The mean AR and RAR are shown at the bottom-right of each chart. The number Ts at the bottom of each chart is a measure of the
time at which the epidemic had clearly taken off in each city: the mean time at which 1% of the population were infected. The numbers A and B at
the upper-left indicate the mean amount of drugs A and B used (in terms of stockpile coverage, which means the number of treatment courses per
capita). Four scenarios are shown: (A) HK and all 27 cities implemented monotherapy. (B) HK and all 27 cities implemented SMC. (C) HK, New York.
Geneva and 11 other randomly chosen cities implemented SMC; London and 13 other randomly chosen cities implemented monotherapy. (D) Same
as (C) except that HK did not implement SMC.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000085.g003
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range of conditions (Figure G and H in Text S1). In particular, if
most of the immediate neighbors of the source population were
able to control resistance, then other cities (not directly connected
to the source) benefited because they were seeded predominantly
by wild-type virus. Only if most of the neighbors of the source
population failed to control resistance did the benefit of SMC at
the source fail for other downstream populations. This in turn
occurred only if most neighbors implemented monotherapy and pA
was large (see Text S1).
Discussion
Our model predicts that the spread of treatment-induced
antiviral resistance during an influenza pandemic can be
effectively reduced by deploying a small stockpile of a secondary
drug during the early phase of local epidemics. By investigating all
potentially important regions of unknown parameter space we
found that both ECC and SMC reduced the cumulative AR and
the RAR unless the probability of emergence of resistance to the
primary drug was so low that resistance was unlikely to be a
problem or so high that resistance emerged as soon as primary
drug monotherapy began. Using a global model of large cities, we
found that as long as populations that were the main source of
resistant strains employed these strategies (SMC or ECC), then
those same strategies were also effective for populations far from
the source even when some intermediate populations failed to
control resistance.
The implications of our results are straightforward: a small
stockpile of a secondary antiviral could be used to hedge against
the threat of drug-induced antiviral resistance during the next
influenza pandemic in terms of reducing the overall AR and the
RAR (and hence significantly protect the therapeutic value of the
primary antiviral). We have proposed two ways to use such an
antiviral, either as combination therapy (ECC) or as sequential
monotherapy (SMC). Crucially, under a wide range of possible
parameter values, both are superior to the current policy of
monotherapy. Therefore, we recommend that a stockpile of a
second drug be assembled for use in likely source populations at
least (we discuss choices for this drug below), and downstream
populations where possible, and that studies be commenced to
assess the key drivers of the choice between SMC and ECC. Those
drivers are the safety of combination regimens and the degree of
synergy between the drugs in vivo. Safety can and should be
assessed prior to a pandemic, while synergy could be studied
further using seasonal and zoonotic strains of influenza A to
provide a basis for studies of a pandemic strain when it emerges.
At the global scale, the success of these strategies requires source
populations to minimize their prevalence of resistance so that
downstream populations will not be seeded by large numbers of
resistant cases. This prediction suggests that likely downstream
populations have a strong incentive to assist likely source
populations, perhaps with the WHO managing a globally vested
stockpile of secondary antivirals. Although it seems that SMC and
ECC reduce AR by only a small margin (e.g., by about 10% in
Figure 3), their major predicted benefit is the substantial reduction
in RAR (e.g., to as low as RAR=0% in Figure 3) and hence in
mortality related to antiviral resistance.
More specifically, in the context of currently implemented
pandemic preparedness plans, oseltamivir is the only primary
antiviral. Adamantane derivatives and zanamivir are possible
secondary antivirals for the hedging strategies we propose here
(SMC and ECC). Despite high rates of emergence of resistance to
amantadine (e.g., 30% in outpatient adults [26]), there is in vitro
evidence of significant synergy between it and oseltamivir [27,28].
Also, because the two drugs have independent biological mecha-
nisms, they are likely to have independent resistance profiles.
Therefore, ECC could be implemented with an adamantane
derivative as the secondary antiviral to a primary stockpile of
oseltamivir. Our results imply that even when synergy was only
moderate, ECC would be very effective in hedging against
oseltamivir resistance despite the high rates of resistance emergence
for adamantane derivatives (Figure 2; Figure C in Text S1).
However, because side effects due to adamantane derivatives are
non-negligible, side effects from a combination of an adamantane
derivative and oseltamivir could lower the levels of compliance and
must be carefully evaluated before implementation.
Zanamivir is a neuraminidase inhibitor that is comparable to
oseltamivir in efficacy against seasonal influenza [23,33,34].
Circulating oseltamivir-resistant strains are sensitive to zanamivir
[35,36]. Although cross-resistance is a theoretical concern,
zanamivir and oseltamivir bind differently at the neuraminidase
catalytic site and exhibit different drug resistance profiles
[17,37,38]. Although zanamivir is not licensed for treatment in
children younger than 7 years of age and may not be able to
reduce infectiousness, these drawbacks have little impact on the
effectiveness of SMC and ECC (see Text S1). Therefore,
zanamivir should be an effective secondary antiviral for both
SMC and ECC.
Nonetheless, there are some potential implementation issues.
Despite the comparable efficacies of oseltamivir and zanamivir
[33,34], zanamivir’s potentially more cumbersome delivery
method (powder inhalation) and higher cost have caused current
stockpiles to emphasize oseltamivir. For SMC with zanamivir as
the secondary antiviral, a potential hurdle is that the current de
facto second-choice therapy would need to be deployed first, and
this may lower the level of compliance. For ECC with zanamivir as
the secondary antiviral, a safe and effective combination protocol
for zanamivir and oseltamivir would need to be developed. As
additional antivirals are developed in the future, key features
determining an agent’s suitability for use in resistance hedging
strategies will be its effectiveness for monotherapy (to permit
SMC), and its safety in combination with oseltamivir and synergy
in preventing resistance (to permit ECC).
We have used a stochastic model throughout this study. In Text
S1, we formulated a deterministic version of our stochastic model
and compared results for the key scenarios considered in Figure 1
and Table 1 (see also Figure N and Table C in Text S1). Results
were qualitatively similar but the deterministic model did not
accurately estimate the mean behavior of the stochastic model (in
terms of AR and RAR). Thus, while a deterministic model would
have sufficed to show that delaying the use of antivirals could
reduce AR and RAR (compare Figure 1 with Figure N in Text
S1), a stochastic model is more appropriate as it allows us to
quantify the role of chance in the emergence and spread of
antiviral resistance (Figure 1A and 1C) and international spread of
pandemic influenza (where chance effects dominate in the early
stages of the epidemic in each city and in the seeding of each city’s
epidemic [1,30]).
Our study has several limitations due to the assumptions we
used. First, we assumed that the pandemic virus was sensitive to
both drugs when it arrived at the first major city of the global air-
travel network. Second, we assumed that resistance was induced
by treatment only and ignored other ways by which resistance
might emerge (e.g., reassortment with circulating seasonal strains).
Third, we assumed that resistant strains had no fitness cost and
might therefore overestimate the threat of antiviral resistance.
Fourth, the 105-city air travel network that we used might not
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there was not sufficient evidence to choose definitively between the
two alternative strategies, SMC and ECC. We discuss the
implications of each of these limitations below.
A key premise of this study is that the wild-type pandemic strain
was sensitive to both drugs. The effectiveness of our hedging
strategies will be much reduced if the pandemic strain acquires
resistance to the primary antiviral early at the source by means that
are independent of drug pressure, e.g., de novo resistance among
pandemic viruses or reassortment with a circulating seasonal strain
that is resistant. As shown in the global model (Figure 3), even a
small number of resistant pandemic cases at the early phase of local
epidemics would greatly increase the spread of resistance and
diminish the effectiveness of SMC and ECC (see Figure M in Text
S1 for further illustrations). We did not explicitly consider the
cocirculation of an existing human influenza strain which was
resistantto one ormoreoftheantivirals(currently circulatingH1N1
with the H274Y mutation [39]), which would increase the
probability of the emergence of resistant pandemic strains via
reassortment ina human host. We have conducteda supplementary
analysis to show that the effect of this dynamic interaction with a
seasonal strain would likely be small compared to the level of drug-
induced resistance considered in this study (see the section
‘‘Resistance emergence due to reassortment’’ in Text S1 and Figure
K therein). Therefore, the recent establishment of the oseltamivir-
resistant H1N1 strain [12–18] does not affect our conclusions.
Figure 4. A decision flow chart for determining the optimal use of a secondary antiviral for hedging against the threat of antiviral
resistance against the primary drug during an influenza pandemic. Some of the data needed can be collected before the pandemic strikes,
e.g., whether the side effects of combination chemotherapy are tolerable. Other data needed can be collected in real time after the pandemic virus
has been observed, e.g., drug sensitivity of the pandemic virus and whether combination chemotherapy shows high synergy in reducing emergence
of resistance for the pandemic strain.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000085.g004
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The strain infecting a given infectious individual could be sensitive
to (i) both drugs, (ii) only drug A, (iii) only drug B, or (iv) neither
drug. Because the objective of this study was to devise strategies for
hedging against the risk of antiviral resistance, we assumed fully fit
resistant strains as the worst-case scenario and showed that SMC
and ECC with a small stockpile of secondary antivirals were
effective even under such extreme scenarios. We conducted an
additional analysis regarding the implications of less fit emergent
strains and found that the spread of antiviral resistance under
monotherapy was limited if resistant strains were at most 80% as
transmissible as the wild type (see Figure L in Text S1). We chose
not to represent individual mutations of the influenza virus despite
the fact that a single mutation (or a small set of mutations) might
confer resistance to multiple drugs and that the evolutionary
pathway to more fit mutant strains may be via less fit mutant
strains (i.e., stepwise evolution). Implicitly, we assumed that the
time scales of successful mutational pathways would be short
compared to the key timescales of our study: transient, less fit
strains leading to important fit strains would become extinct in
times far shorter than the duration of a single local epidemic.
While we appreciate that a more complex model structure might
be useful to investigate other interesting hypotheses, it seems
unlikely that more than four strains could persist for substantial
periods of time and be epidemiologically significant.
We used our model of 105 large, well-mixed cities connected by
a flight network as a proxy for the global spread of infection, which
is consistent with a previous analysis of the seasonal spread of
influenza [40] and other theoretical studies of pandemic influenza
[3,4], i.e., each city represents the entire local population which
would normally use an airport of that city. Therefore, our results
with regard to the population size of each city must be treated with
some caution because the quoted size of the city may not
correspond directly to the size of the population that would enter
the flight network at that point.
We present a flowchart (Figure 4) that could be used to choose
between SMC and ECC. If initial reports of the transmissibility of
the novel virus suggest that containment is unlikely to be achieved
with antiviral intervention, SMC is the safer of the two strategies
because (i) it does not depend on the synergistic effects of the two
drugs, (ii) it does not depend on a low probability of resistance
emergence to the secondary antiviral, and (iii) it does not require
individuals to take two drugs in combination. However, if
containment with antivirals appears to be feasible, and it can be
demonstrated that the primary and secondary antiviral can be
taken safely and effectively in combination, then ECC would be
the safer strategy because it maximizes the probability of
containment.
We chose to investigate incremental additions to current
pandemic preparedness plans, rather than more extreme strate-
gies. If safe combinations of antivirals were developed, then the use
of combination chemotherapy for the full duration of national
epidemics would necessarily be more effective than ECC.
However, the additional investment in drug B beyond the levels
we considered here is unlikely to be justified by the relatively small
marginal benefit (Figure I in Text S1). Further, we have identified
plausible parameter combinations for which full combination
chemotherapy would perform less well than SMC.
For nations that are currently maintaining a stockpile of a single
antiviral with the intention of mitigating the effects of the next
influenza pandemic, the inclusion of a small stockpile of a second
antiviral does not represent a substantial additional investment.
However, our model predicts substantial potential benefits for
populations that use a second antiviral early in their epidemic to
limit the impact of the emergence of resistance. These benefits are
unlikely to be attenuated by the global spread of resistance unless
early users of antiviral intervention fail to control resistance.
Hence, a small stockpile of a secondary antiviral therapy is an
attractive public health hedge.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Algorithms and additional sensitivity analyses.
Found at: doi:doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000085.s001 (3.66 MB
PDF)
Video S1 Four stochastic realizations of the global
spread of pandemic influenza and antiviral resistance
for the scenario in Figure 3A. For graphical clarity, Hawaii
and Wellington are not shown. The city markers would overlap
significantly if the entire world map were shown.
Found at: doi:doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000085.s002 (4.44 MB
MOV)
Video S2 Four stochastic realizations of the global
spread of pandemic influenza and antiviral resistance
for the scenario in Figure 3B. For graphical clarity, Hawaii
and Wellington are not shown. The city markers would overlap
significantly if the entire world map were shown.
Found at: doi:doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000085.s003 (4.30 MB
MOV)
Video S3 Four stochastic realizations of the global
spread of pandemic influenza and antiviral resistance
for the scenario in Figure 3C. For graphical clarity, Hawaii
and Wellington are not shown. The city markers would overlap
significantly if the entire world map were shown.
Found at: doi:doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000085.s004 (4.32 MB
MOV)
Video S4 Four stochastic realizations of the global
spread of pandemic influenza and antiviral resistance
for the scenario in Figure 3D. For graphical clarity, Hawaii
and Wellington are not shown. The city markers would overlap
significantly if the entire world map were shown.
Found at: doi:doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000085.s005 (4.33 MB
MOV)
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Background. Every winter, millions of people catch
influenza—a viral infection of the airways—and about half
a million people die as a result. These seasonal ‘‘epidemics’’
occur because small but frequent changes in the viral
proteins (antigens) to which the human immune system
responds mean that an immune response produced one year
provides only partial protection against influenza the next
year. Influenza viruses also occasionally appear that contain
major antigenic changes. Human populations have little or
no immunity to such viruses so they can start deadly
pandemics (global epidemics). The 1918–19 influenza
pandemic, for example, killed 40–50 million people. The
last influenza pandemic was in 1968 and many experts fear
the next pandemic might strike soon. To prepare for such an
eventuality, scientists are trying to develop vaccines that
might work against an emerging pandemic influenza virus. In
addition, many governments are stockpiling antiviral drugs
for the large-scale treatment of influenza and for targeted
prophylaxis (prevention). Antiviral drugs prevent the
replication of the influenza virus, thereby shortening the
length of time that an infected person is ill and protecting
uninfected people against infection. Their widespread use
should, therefore, slow the spread of pandemic influenza.
Why Was This Study Done? Although some countries are
stockpiling more than one antiviral drug in preparation for
an influenza pandemic, many countries are investing in large
stockpiles of a single drug, oseltamivir (Tamiflu). But
influenza viruses can become resistant to antiviral drugs
and the widespread use of a single drug (the primary
antiviral) is likely to increase the risk that a resistant strain will
emerge. If this did happen, the ability of antiviral drugs to
slow the spread of a pandemic would be greatly reduced. In
this study, the researchers use a mathematical model of
influenza transmission to investigate whether a small
stockpile of a secondary antiviral drug could be used to
prevent the adverse consequences of the emergence of
antiviral-resistant pandemic influenza viruses.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
used their model of influenza transmission to predict how
two strategies for the use of a small stockpile of a secondary
antiviral might affect the cumulative attack rate (AR; the final
proportion of the population infected) and the resistant
attack rate (RAR; the proportion of the population infected
with an influenza virus strain resistant to the primary drug, a
measure that may reflect the impact of antiviral resistance on
death rates during a pandemic). In a large, closed
population, the model predicted that both ‘‘early
combination chemotherapy’’ (treatment with both drugs
together while both are available) and ‘‘sequential multi-
drug chemotherapy’’ (treatment with the secondary drug
until it is exhausted, then treatment with the primary drug)
would reduce the AR and the RAR compared with
monotherapy unless the probability of emergence of
resistance to the primary drug was very low (resistance
rarely occurred) or very high (resistance emerged as soon as
the primary drug was used). The researchers then introduced
international travel data into their model to investigate
whether these two strategies could limit the development of
antiviral resistance at a global scale. This analysis predicted
that, provided the population that was the main source of
resistant strains used one of the strategies, both strategies in
distant, subsequently affected populations would be able to
reduce the AR and RAR even if some intermediate
populations failed to control resistance.
What Do These Findings Mean? As with all mathematical
models, the accuracy of these predictions depends on the
assumptions used to build the model and the data fed into
it. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that both of the
proposed strategies for the use of small stockpiles of
secondary antiviral drugs should limit the spread of drug-
resistant influenza virus more effectively than monotherapy
with the primary antiviral drug. Thus, small stockpiles of
secondary antivirals could provide a hedge against the
development of antiviral resistance during the early phases
of an influenza pandemic and are predicted to be a
worthwhile public-health investment. However, note the
researchers, experimental studies—including determinations
of which drugs are safe to use together, and how effectively
a given combination prevents resistance compared with
each drug used alone—are now needed to decide which of
the strategies to recommend in real-life situations. In the
context of the 2009 global spread of swine flu, these findings
suggest that public health officials might consider zanamivir
(Relenza) as the secondary antiviral drug for resistance-
limiting strategies in countries that have stockpiled
oseltamivir.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1000085.
N The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
provides information about influenza for patients and
professionals, including specific information on pandemic
influenza and on influenza antiviral drugs
N The World Health Organization provides information on
influenza (in several languages) and has detailed guide-
lines on the use of vaccines and antivirals during influenza
pandemics
N The UK Health Protection Agency provides information on
pandemic influenza
N MedlinePlus provides a list of links to other information
about influenza (in English and Spanish)
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